US - Iraq Security Agreement

The Players:

Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Oversight
Chairman William Delahunt D-MA

Noted Representatives:
Ron Paul R-TX
Dana Rohrbacher R
Jeff Flake R
Walter Jones R-NC

From Al-Fadhali - Nationalist Shiite party based in Southern Iraq
Nadeem Al-Jaberi.

From the National Dialgue Council - Nationalist Sunni Islamist political party
Sheikh Khalaf Al-Ulayyan.

Congressional Research Service Specialist in Middle East Affairs
Kenneth Katzman.

Color me confused.

Both of these individuals, representing the Iraqi Parliament, have stated that a timetable is necessary. Indeed, it is the presence of U.S. troops, it can be inferred from thier statements, which is driving the insurgents and gangs to attack. Al-Jaberi stated that if a timetable is announced there would be a calm and the militias would soon stop since they would have no reason to fight against their compatriots.

...

What I fail to understand is how that is true, considering what occured in Sadr City. That was a case of Iraqis fight against their compatriots, seperated by their loyalties. What's even odder is the fact that they admit that the militias are divided by loyalties which only makes their statement that U.S. forces in the are responsbile for the formation of militias and the sectarian violence that has flashed up at times seem contradictory. They mention Paul Bremer's foolish decision to integrate militias into the Security Forces, which dilluded the discipline of the forces

Kenneth Katzman came in and saved my sanity to some degree by explaining underlying agendas involved in both testimonies by Al-Ubayyan and Al-Jaberi. He depicts the Iraqi Parliament as being represenative of the Haves and Have-Nots with the representatives being part of the Have-Nots (I may be incorrect with this, but I believe he stated the representatives as being as such) and thus pushing for a withdrawal. Those Shias and Sunnis who have money and are in power, like Prime Minister Al-Maliki, want the U.S. forces to stay in order to protect their assets and maintain the status quo. Those like Al-Sadr, are against the U.S. presence for their own interests; if the U.S. is maintaining the status quo there is less power for other forces to nab with a stabilizing force in place like the U.S. in place to keep the power in the hands of those who already hold it. Al-Sadr, Katzman notes, represents the discord and discontent felt by the Shia masses that are in poverty or dire situations. He has garnered his political strength as a result of this and created his militia. In the case that the U.S. military would leave, his militia would be able to possibly overthrow the current government and grow the Iranian sphere of influence.

The status of militias is another important matter. Katzman seems to color the situation in a way which favors the perspective that Prime Minister Al-Maliki declared his "War on Militias" in a disingenuous manner not to rid Iraq of militias but in order to quell dissent near elections. This would explain the declaration against militias and the standoff in Sadr city not as a matter of national security for Iraq but as a political ploy. Katzman does not explain the militias in terms of the Sadr milita standoff against Iraqi security forces but in much broader and more worrisome ways.

According to Katzman, PM Al-Maliki's interpretation and reasoning in defining what an illegal militia is has been based off of legal documents that define any militia in existence after Saddam was overthrown as being illegal while using the Iraqi security forces as a "legal" militia. The Security forces are not an institution that is loyal to the idea of a united Iraq but a division of militias that are united under PM Al-Maliki raher than the country itself. By this analysis a horrifying truth is revealed, a disturbing understanding of the present situation; as Representative Delahunt stated as he concurred with Katzman, the US is funding a militia in the Security Forces since there is not a cultivation of the idea of Iraq as a nation rather than a group of militias. This is the irony, that Al-Maliki is fightng militias and yet is using a militia to consolidate power. The identity of Iraq, of a military that is united around the survival of a nation rather than of loyalty to an individual is missing. How can a democracy flourish without the essential ingredient of pride in one's nation above pride in political leaders?

What will happen if we leave and PM Al-Maliki lacks the U.S. presence necessary to protect the status quo? The Security Forces will fracture and Al-Maliki will not be able to hold onto his power. There will be fighting in Baghdad and relative peace in the North and South because of large concentrations of specific sects (I believe this is about the jist of what he said). Also, Iran has been the greatest benefactor of the US involvement in Iraq.


What I have gleaned from this is just how complicated Iraq is. Ordinarily, we jus break it down between leaving and staying but the subtlties and drastic changes which can occur with either decision have not been fully vetted by the media and must be spoken about. Perhaps in those town hall meetings McCain's been talking about we can have an honest debate about what we need to do.